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The object of this thesis is to show that according
to the weight of authority and upon principle

the

followiRn,- proposition is true :
ONE WIO KNOW'11GLY ITLDUCE1 ONE PARTY TO A VALID
CO"TTRACT TO CO'rIT A BTREACH OF THE CONTRXC(? 19 LIABLE
TO THE OTHER PARTY TO SUC77 CONTRACT FOR THE ACTUAL DAMAGES OF WMIC71 79Ig ACT IS THE PROXIMALE CAUSE.

CHAPTER I.

IT0TRODUCTION.

The infrequency with which
before

the courts

surprising,

this question has come

to be rtviewed and dctermined is

for the question is not s(;ttled, but is an

open one, and a seemingly close one.

A glunce at how

irreconcilable are the results reached in the few
reported cases will show this.

One finds

not only that

the highest courts differ one from another,

but in some

of the cases very able dissenting opinions.

This fact

makes the subject teem with interest to the student
of law.

lie turns to the

text-book#, hoping to find

them guides to lead him through this uncertain field,
but in vain,

for it is curious to note the manner in

which their authors have
dismissing it with a word.

treated the question,
Have the:- considered it of

little interest, reachinr their conclusion, as is too
often the case in this day and generation,

by using

the amount of litigation it has caused as the test ;
or, are they loath to attempt to elucidate an entangled
subject ?

Be this as it may,

we consider the

question of sufficient interest to repay our careful

study.
The subject is important on account of the
additional remedy afforded by allowing an action against
the party causinf-; the breach and t-e protective
of the same.
tract is

tendency

The measuru of' damages for breach of con-

sometimes inadequate.

the case of a contract
on a certain day.
bankruptcy,

Tak(,for example,

to pay a certain sum of money

The failure so to do may mean

financial ruin, yet the measure of dam-

ages is limited to the interest on the money from the
day it should have been paid to the day of the judgment,
other damages being too remote.

If in this case

the breach was caused solely by the act of a third
party,

should he not be responsible for the damages

caused by his act ?

Again, it often happens that the

the contract is

one breaking

irresponsible,

action against him would result in
judgment.

At the same time,

and an

an uncollectible

the inducing party may be

a wealthy individual who is reaping revenge in this
indirect way,
labor union,

or the prime mover may be a responsible
wishing by such means to force certain

persons to join its ranks, or to compel some employer
to submit to its rules.

In such cases are wu to say

that courts of justice must stand by and see the indithe union compel submission to

vidual reap revenge,

its mandates, or deal out destruction as the alternative ?

Are the courts when appealed to for protection

to be compelled to admit that they are powerless to
grant relief ?
A glazce at the labor situation of our country
will show that the question is daily growing more practical.
oreadth;

The keynote of former ages was universality,
the watch word of the

ialization,

depth.

19th century is spec-

This is shown not only in the

field of intellectual pursuits,

but in the scientific

and mechanical occupations as well.

In the words of

thG political economist Division of Labor is the command.
The widespread effect of this system is not apparent
to the casual observer.

Yet, when one remembers

that it requires more capital to conduct a business
in which such a system is in vogue,

although in the

end the cost of production is less,

corporations

are at once suggested.

Corporations call to mind com-

petition between them and the individual,
lowed by the individual,

which is fol-

after an unsuccessful attempt

to cope with this powerful rival,

7ivin - up the fight

8
and accepting employment at the hand of the corporation.
To be freed from competing with his fellow workmen
for !.hose coveted positions and also to be relieved

from oppression by the corporationthe laborer turned to
nature for advice.
object lessons,

As usual, she was rOt wanting in

and he learned from her that in

union is strength.

The result of this observation

was communicated in every direction, and men of every

profession and trade hurried to form themselvs into
unions,

ostensibly for their mutual protection and

advancement.

Individuality has been, union now is.

The power of some of these unions is almost
disastrous to the labor and commercial interests of our
country.

In many cases the officers of such an

organization dictate which men shall be employed in certain businesses, and which men shall be discharged.
They are aided in this kingly prerogative by the system
of division of labor,

for such a system is accompanied

by the disadvantage of the dopendency of one class of
workmen upon another.

Watch the working of any large

manufaoturint establishment,

and you see that if the

employees in any department cease to work those employed in every department, dependent upon the inoperative

one for material must also stop.

While in the past

individuals may have been prevented by a sense of
Justicc from interfein: with the contracts of others,
in this day of corporations and laoor unions we may
expect a change, looking for this to be a fruitful
source of litigationi.

This is especially true since the

unions carry their plans into execution by calling
out their members.

'his causo

them to break contracts,

and in manr cases, this is followed by other contracts

being broken.
We have refurred to these mritters in a summary

manner,

yet we deem their mere mention sufficient

to show that the subject under discussion is interesting, important, and practical.

This buing so,

feel that our choice of a subject is a wise one,

we
and

that time devoted to its study cannot be without profit.

CHAPTER II.
SKETCH OF THE ENGLI51

CASES.

In this sketch of the English cases we shall
select but a few of the leading ones,

bein; able in

this way to treat them more in detail, and to dwell
longer upon the important points.
Harely do we find a case,
one of the series,

especially the first

in which the different lines of

reasoning that are to divide the highest and most

learned

of the Enilish speaking courts upon the ques-

tion involved,

are brought forward arid discussed.

This being so

in the case of Lumley v. Gye (2 E & B

216),

the case which forms the foundation of the doct-

rine it enunciated,

time will. not be misspent in con-

sidering at some length the facts in the case and
the conclusions reached by the different justices.
The case was brought before the Court of queen's 3L'nch
in 1853, by Gye's demurring to Lumlcy's declaration
On the ground that the facts stated did not constitute
a

anuse of action.

these :

The facts in the case were briefly

The plaintiff, Benjamin Lumley, was lessee

and manager of the Queen's Theater, London.

In i4ovem-

bar, 1851,

he entered into a written contract with

Toseph Bacher,

as agent of Mlle. Johanna Wagner,

whereby the latter agreed to sing at the plaintiff's

theatre for three rmonths beginning in April, 1852.
The contract contained, among other conditions, one to
the effect that

"Mil1.

Wagner engages herself not to

use her talents at any other theatre,

nor in any

concert or reunion, public or private, without the
written authority of '.Ir. Lumley."
1 DeG M4 & G #604).

(Lumley v. Wagner,

The defendant, Frederick Gys,

before the expiration of the thrte months fixed by the
contract, knowingly induced 1il1e. Wagner to break her
contract with the plaintiff, and to enter into a contract with him, Gye, whereby she agreed to sing at the
Covert Garden Theatre.

After procuring an injunction

against Johanna Wagner,

restraining her from performing

at Covert Garden Theatre(Lumley v. Wagner 1 DeG :I & G
#04),

Lumley-brinr.s this action to recover from Gye the

actual damages he sustained by the latter's malicious
interference with the plaintiff's contract, by procuring

Tohanna Wagner "to break her contract and not

to perform or sing at plaintiff's theatre and to
continue away during the time for which she was engaged.*

The court was called upon

to decide whether or not

such facts stated a cause of action,

and answered the

question in the affirmative.

ITowever,

since the opinion was not unanimous and

since the majority differed to some extent as to the
reasoning upon which their decision rested,

it will be

well to note briefly the opinion of each.

(1rompton, J., after stating the case as he understood it says : "Whatever may have beun the origin or
foundation of the law as to enticing, of servants, and
whether it be, as contended by the plaintiff, an instance and branch of a wider rule
as contended by the defendant,

,

or whether it be,

at- anomaly and an

exception from the general rule of law on such subjects,
it

ms.

now be considered clear law that a person who

wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same
thing, with notice, interrupts the relation subsisting
butwoen master and servant by procuring the servant
to depart from the master's service,

.

.

.

. commits

a wrongful act, for which he is responsible at law."
After stating that the relation of master and servant
existed in this case sufficiently to apply the rule and
that he -does not however wish to be considered as say-

13
ing that in no case, except that of master and servant,

is an action maintainable for maliciously inducing another
to break a contract to the injury of the person with
whom such contract has been made,

he continues : "With-

out, however, deciding any such more general question,
I think that wt

are justified in applying the principle

of the action for enticing away servants to a case
where the defendant maliciously procures a party,

who

is under a valid contract to give her exclusive personal
service to the plaintiff for a specified period,

to

refuse to give such service during the period for which

she has so contracted,

whereby the plaintiff was in-

Jured."
Erle, qT.,

states bis opinion in broad and compre-

hansive terms, as will appear from the following : "It

is clear that the procurement of the violation of a
ri,'ht is a

cause of action in all instances where the

violation is an actionable wrong.

When this principle

is applied to a violation of a right arising upon a contract of hiring,
is

the nature of the service contracted

immaterial.*
Wightman, J.,

opinion.

gives a very exhaustive and learned

After reviewing several cases, in which an

14
he says : "Upon the

action upon the case was allowed,
whole,

therefore, I am of opinion that, upon the gener-

al principles upon which actions upon the case are foundad,

as well as upon authority,

maintainablh.

It is not,

the present action is

however,

necessary,

for

the itaintnance of the third count of the declaration
af least, to rely upon so general a principle ;
the case,

for

at all events, appears to me to fall within

the cases which the defendant considers art
to the general rule,

held maintainabl

exceptions

and in which actions have been

for procuring persons to quit the

service in which they have been rtetainc

and employed.

The defendant contends that the exception is limited to
the cases of apprentices and menial servants, and
others to whom the provisions of the Statutes of
Labourers will be applicable.

It appears to me, howevej

upon consideration of the cases cited upon the argument,
that the right of an employer to laintain an action on
the case for procurin-j or inducing persons in

his ser-

vice to abandon their employment is not so limited ;
but

that it

extends to t:.L case of persons who have

contracted for personal service for a ti-e,

and wnh,

during the period have been wrongfully procured and

incited to abandon such service,

to the loss of the

person whom they havu contracted to serve.

The right

to maintain such an action is by the common law,
not by the Statute of Labourers,
a remedy,

and

which, however, gave

which the common law did not,

in cases where

persons within the purview of the statute have voluntarily left

the service iY. which they were engaged,

have been retained by another who knew of ti. ir

and
previous

The remedies and penalties given by this

employment.

and the next subsequent Statute of Labourers

were

limited to the persons described in them ;

but the

remedies given by the common law are not In

terms

limited to any description of servant or of service."
We come next to the dissenting opinion of eoleridge,
J.,

in which he states the conclusions hu seeks to es-

tablish.

They arc thusu : "That in respect of breach of

contract the general rule of our law is to confine its
ri-medies by action to the

contractin6 parties,

and

the damages directly and proximately consequential
on the act of him who is suud ;
master and servant,

that, as between

there is an adr.itted exception ;

that this exception dates f-om the 3tatute of Labourers,
25 Rdw. III,

and both on principle and according to

authority Is-limited by it.*
We agree with the lesArned Judge in
scope of the Statute of Labourers.

regard to the

H1owever, we join

issue with him regarding the lines of reasoning he
pursues in the rest of his opinion.
enter into a discussion of its
state our views in
mentioninr- in

Yet w(: shall not

merits here,

a more convenient place,

this connection that we

but shall
simply

differ from him.

As a result of the foregoing investigation,

we find

that the judges were feeling their way very cautiously,
trying with their characteristic adherencu to precedents
to rest their decision upon some familiar- doctrine.
We see that two chains of reasoning were advanced.
The more conservative held that the contract was within
the principle of the Statute of Labourers, and should
be governed by it ;

the others held that the right was

derived from the common law,

and that the nature of the

service was immaterial.
Of course this case called forth a great deal of
comment and criticism.

As a result of this when a

similar case came up for decision the court understood
more clearly the law applicable to the facts.
1881,

In

the next case of interest to us camt before

the Court of Appeals.
Fall (6

Q 'B Div 333).

It was the case of Bowen v.
The action was for knowinLly

procurin, a skilled workman,

who, with a few others,

possessed a secret process for manufacturin!-, glazed
bricks,

to break his contract with the plaintiff for

exclusive service for five.years.

The court, realiz-

ing that the principle of the Statute of Labourers
could not be properly extended to such a case,

repudia-

stating that they would

ted that line of reasoning,

have much doubt as to whether they would support Lumley
v. Oye if, in order to do so,
adopt this proposition,

they would have to

feelingj that the dissentin,

opinion of Coleridge, J., was almost conclusive upon
that

point.

They, however,

second chain of reasoning,
the cast; upon it.

fully agreed with the

and rested th.. decision of

This case put at rest

forever the

question involved.
Since

the

court used very general language

case last referred to,

it

in

the

night be questioned whether

or not the principle they proclaimed would extend to
contracts of every description,

the case before them

for determination involving a contract for personal service only.

The case of Temperton v.

hussell (1893,

18
1 Q B 715),

the last case of importance to us,

all doubt in regard to this inquiry,

removed

for in that case

the doctrine was carried to its full extent.

The con-

tract which the defendant knowintgly caused to be broken
was one whereby material for iunilding purposes were to
The court followed the reasoning of

be furnished.

and treated it

Bowen v. HTall,

as

settled law that one

wio knowingly induces a party to any contract to break
it commits an actionable wrong if injury results.
Another question before the court in Temperton v.
Russell was whether or not an action would lie against
one who with actual malice caused a party not to
enter into a contract

with another party.

ages may be the same whother one is
enter into a contract,

or,

The dam-

persuaded not to

having enterea into it,

induced to immediately hroak it.

is

Yet, the grounds for

allowing an action must of necessity be different in the
two cases.

Therefore we shall not treat this question,

it bein., outside of the scope of this thesis.
We sco from this review of the English authorities,
that they are in favor of allowing an action in these
cases and that they have extended the doctrine whenever necessary.

CHAPTER III.
SKETCH OF THE AMERICAN CASES.
We come now to the American cases,
reconcilably divided ;
idge, J.,

some holding,

whioh are iras did Coler-

in Lumley v. Gye, that the doctrine originated

in the Statuto of Labourers,

and should uot be extended#

othrs holding, as do the Eri).ish cases generally,
that it has no such origin, and is
such narrow boundaries.

not confined within

In fact, some cases have aris-

en which called for the courts to extend the doctrine tO
its full extent,

atid thej

have responded to the call.

In the treatment of this chapter we shall, as in
upon the English cases,

soluct

t

the one

fuw of the leading

cases to show the trend of the decisions .; firsts as to
those holding with the English theory,

then as to

those followin; Coleridge, J.
The case which perhaps holds the sami

r. lative

position umong the American casesas does Lumley v.
Gye among the English,
555),

decided in 1871.

case in three counts.

is Walker v.

Cronin (107 M{ass

T,)e plaintiffs stalted their
First, that they were manufac-

turers and sellers of boots and shoes, and employed many

20
that defendant,

men to work for them ;

knowing these

with the unlawful purpose of preventing

facts induced,

the plaintiffs fro,-- carryin';, on their bhsiness,

said

poxsons to leave the eriploymont of the plaintiffs without their consent and against their will,

whereby

The second count was to

t-e plaintiffs w(-,re damaged.

the effect that the plaintiffs had k.-itered into
contracts with a lai gu number of persons skilled in
art of makilng hoots and shoes,
had,

the

whei'eby zaid persons

for a valuable consideration agreed to make certain

stock into boots and shoes and return the s3ime to plaintiffs;

that df(.ndart kt.o:i;n,; all

persons to brea
wcrt

their contracts,
In thel

damuaged.

third coi,-It,

this inluc ,d said
whereby the plaintiffs
th y sut forth

the fact that such a contract,as was described in
second countwas cntered into by the plaintiffs,
one Lyman L.

emplef,

him to break it,

ard that the

the
and

defendan'. had induced

whereby the i'laintiffs were injured.

.he court states in

its

opinion thr.l,if a contract

eiAsted by which one person had a 1(1gal right to the
further continuanct-o

of the services of another,

who knowingly and intentiotially procured it
lated, muy be held liablh; for the wrong.

one

to be vioThe ccnrt

21
continues in substance thaL the doctrine did not spring
from the Englis'

Statute of Labourers,

fined to menial service

ol umployraezit,

description.

not con-

; but is founded upon the legal

right derived from the contract,
contracts

and is

if

und applies to all

not to conttctn of every

The opinion concludes as fol,.ows : "Upon

care.ful considerution of the.. authorities as well as of

the principle involved,
causL of action is

we are of opinion that

t

legal

sufficiently stated in each of the

three counts of the declaration."
The iext casc of iraportanct.
Royster (70

.C C01),

to us is

decided in 1674.

U[askins v.
In this case

the plaintiff had employed oertuin laborcrs to work on
his farm under written contract.

The defendant persuad-

ed these workmen to leave the plaintiff'< cnployment,
whereby the plaintiff was injured.

The majority of

the cour-t held that an action would lie under these
circumstrinces.

Rodman,

J.,

wl}o delivcreJ the

opinion of the court proceeds az follows :

"We

it. to be a settled principle of law that if

one

tracts upon

take
con-

l consideration to render personal service

to another, any third person who maliciously,

that is$

without lawful justification, induces the partywho con-

tracted to render the sorvice, to rofuse to do so is
liable to the party in an action for dwrage:'."
Three years later in the same state we find before
the court for decisio

(7C

T' C 3,17,

the case of Jones v. Stanley

in wh;ich the contract broken was not one

of persoral service.

summary rnnner,
Staling that it

The case i

dispose.! Of in a

thc- jidge,delivering the opinion,
was dccided in M.askins v. 1oystor that

if a person maliciousay, enliced laborers to break
their contracts with their eiployers and desert their
service,

the employers may rccover damages a,-ainst

such person.

He further states that the same reason-

ing covers every case where ont. person maliciously persuades aother to bre': any contrrct with ; third person,

it not being confined to co!tracts for

service.

Time and space will riot permit of our examining any more
cases upon this side of the question.

The cases al-

rcady discussed show that at least some of the courts
of this country have proceeded along the same lines
t',Pt the Enr !1ish courts in later years have followed.
In passing we 'ust

also give so-ie of the cases

upon th, other side of the question.
no ever-wideninr

-ince there is

doctrine in these cases,

but a constan t

adherence to the lirmits placed in the early c ,ses,
it will not be neces3ary to follow tTnef
order.

An examincitio:

in clironological

of some two or three of t',e lat-

est cases will suffic..

Wo find two cases decided in

l .l at the same term of a Kentucky court,
ported in 15 S W Rep.

at p 57 and at p 60.

first, mambers v. Raldwin,

and rtThe

was a case in whicv

defc.,~nt induced one '.Tis. 1, break

the

. coritractwhereby

he had agreed to sell his ther! tndivided share in a
crop of tobacco to the firm of Chambers & -Iarshali,
and to sill the same to the deferd-,rt.
tha1

It was decided

these facts did not entitle the plaintiff to a

right of action.

The court procteded upon the thcory

that each party to a contract "enters into it with his
eyes open, and expects to look alone to the other
for redress in case of breach by 1him.

There can bel

the court continues, "but two classes of exceptions
o-u.; such exception was made by th,, English Statute of Labourers,

.

.

.

the othor arises -;en a person

has been procured against

iis will

or contrary to his

purpose by coercion or deception of anoth-er to break
is contract."

Th,:_n follows a discussion to the effect

that "an action legal in itself and which violates no

24
right cannot be made aotionable on account of the motive
which induced it."
prove,

Assuming as true what it wished to

namely that the act was legal and

lated no right,
clusion that

that it vio-

the court, of necessity, drew the con-

no action lay.

'he other Kentucky crise,

that of Eoulier v. Vncauley, was a case in which the
defendant induced the manager of '.KT'y Anderson to
break a contract with the plaintiff,
to perform at the plaintiff's theatre,

whereby she was
and to enter

into another contract whereby she was to perform at the
defendant's theatre.
rasoin.

The court, applying the same

as was applied :n the other case,

held no recovery.

of course

It will be seen that the facts in

this case were substantially the same as those in
aLilley v.

"Iy0.

Th6 latest reported1 cast. in this, country,
that no right of
(98 Cal b76),

action lies,

holding

is Boyson v. Thorn

decided in 1893.

In that case the de-

fendant maliciously persuaded one Newlands to break a
contract with the plain-iff,

whereby he, '!ewlands,

had agrccd to furnish the plaintiff with rooms and
meals.

The court in decidin

the case stated that ac-

tions would lie in those cases in which the relation

P,5

of master and servant existed,

and also in these cases

where the breach was caused by fraud, threat, and the
lTowever the court would not extend the doc-

like.
trine,

and as the case did not fall

under either of

the above classifications, they refused

to allow

tl"e plaintiff his action.
These cases are enou:h to show how irreconcilable
are thc courts ;

one class assu-ies certain facts

and reaches certain results,

thc other class assur-es

different premises arid draws different conclusions.
ionwever,

upon the whole we think that the better reason-

ed decisions arc, in favor of allowin
such cases.

a remedy in

CHAPTER IV.
THE DOCTRINE UPON PRIIC IPLE.
Prom the cases we sj.!ected for treatment
ceding chapters,

it

in

the pre-

will be soon that it is not

our purpose to enter into a discussion of those cases
in which the re]ation of master and scrvant in the
strict meaning of those terms exists;

nor shall we

devote an,. time to those cases in which unlawful
means,

such as threats,

the broach.

have been used in procuring

All agree that under such circunstances

the injureu party is

ontitled to an action.

v. Thorn,

; Chambers v.

5'

96 Cal 57-

; Old D)ominion S S Co v.

Lto:'

v.

3,. L ;

WcKenna,

.raldwin, 15 S 7T Rep
30 i'oi 48;

2ye,
1 E & :3 216 ; Benton v.

ce v. Vanley, (36 !. Y 82 ;

Boyson

Prntt,

,retes v.

2 'Vend

,Blocker,

43 Ga 331 ; i3axbyr v. Dunlap, 22 Am Rop 475 ; Johnston
Harvester Co v. L>einhardt,

9 Abb :, C 55.3.

It

is

to

thosc cases into which neither of these elements
enter that we shall confine oursAves, and ondeavor Lo
show that upon principle an acti:nr

solild lie

in

such

cases.
If

,.ere are actl-al damages, of which the act of

the party canplained of is the cause, upon principles
the inj-;red party should not

of equity and Juistice,

bi

withou.t relief in the absence of any valid reason
It

for withholding it.

a gener,] r-le

is %ithout a remedy,

t!at no vrong
bhrinr,

Is

of 3an

the exceptions

t>os" crses in which Justice demands a contrary

h.oJ.ing.

Therefore we contend that

dismz~sion, an action should lie
olppose it

sho,," affirrmativel:

in the case iinder

unless those xho

that it

should be denied.

Let us first consider the chain of reasoning follo-, cd by _dleridge,
correct,

J,, in TtL'wley v.

o,r investigation is

C(Ie,

at an end.

for if

it

be

',e contended

that the right to recove - in such cases snrar g from
the Statute o: Labourers,

and that it

should not b6

oxtended beyond those cases in which the relation of
master an1 servant in the strict meaning of those terms
exists.

'Ve agree with the learned Judge that the

princil le of the 3tatute of Labourers should be so limited.

owever,

did the ri,:->t of aoti :n in such cases

thus originate ?

The state of societr in Zn;-land at

the time of the passage of this statute made its
enactment imperative.

pestilence,

i':nglend had been visited by

known in history as the Yi"ack DeathT,,

which

resulted in
In number.

the laborin,

class being greatly redtced

So much so that the demand for laborers

was great enough to admit of their demanding unusually
high wages.

If this demand was refused, they travel-

ed from place to place, feeling sure of getting employsent elsewhere.

This resulted in many places being

neglected for want of workmen.

To remedy this"'state

of affairs, the statute was passed.

It said nothing

about directly inducing a cohtract to be broken.
fact, this was not the evil aimed at.'

In

'It was enacted

to compel laborers to specifically perform their contracts,

and to accomplish this it

made it

a wrong,

'

l

for one to employ a laborer if he knew that the laborer
was bound to serve another.
Let us see ifl we can discover any reason for the
courts'

placing any stress upon thi3

early cases.
case,

Lumley v.

doctrine in

the

It will be remembered that the first
Gye,

to call for Judicial decision

'

';:

was one in which the relation of master and servant existed,
terms.

although not in

The strict

irteaulng of those

The defendant er'!loyod Johonna

that she was bound to sa;*ve another.
then,

that the English Judges ;ith

aigzer,
Was it

knoWing

strange,

their charatoristio

29
conservatism and love of precedents, should have leaned
towards extending a well known doctrine to this case,
It

although a different kind of action was brought 9

will be remembered that they were not, however, completeI,, satisfied with this reasoning,
exception of Qoleridgo, J.,
of boldness that the case

and each, with the

stated in different degrees
might be decided upon other

grounds, and be extended to contracts other than those
in which the relation of master and servant existed.'
While they knew that the nature of the service to be
rendered affected the right to recover for enticing
away a servant,

they seemed to also see that in

the

day of com ,lete labor emancipation all contracts would
be entered into in the same manner,
contracting upon a legal equality,

master and servant
and thoft under such

c trci;nstances the nature of the service

to be, rendered

would be no criterion by which to judge as to a right
of action for causing a breach of contract.
& F Sec 303 ; Temperton v. Russel,

Lish Dir

1893, 1 f) B 718.

-gui3 S Co v. ?McGregor, lh92 A C 25 ;

T'lker v.

Cronin, 107 !Ja.s .556.
We feel that the reasoning by which a right to rccover for causing a breach of contract is said to be
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founded upon the Statute of Labourers and to be limited
to contracts of personal service is Incorrect.

If a

right is to be allowed it must be upon different grounds.
Afi r a close study of the question we haveconcluded
that the right to recover is founded on common law (L',micy v. Oye 2 E & B p 241),

is derived from the contract
ass p 567), add is not

itself. (Walker v. Cronin, 107

limited to those contracts in which the relation of
master and servant exists.

Temiperton v.

Russe'll,

1893,

I Q B 715 ; Jones v. Stanley, 76 N C 355 ; fish nonCont Law Sec 495.

states the following :

"The contract confers hdrtain

rights on the person with whom it
only binds the parties to it
into ;

court

In Temperton v. Fussell, the

is made, and

by the obliga ,ons

not
entered

but also imposes on all thy world the

duty to respect the contractual obligation". (Temperton
v. Russell, 193, I Q B p 730).

Lawson, in his work on

contracts, states the principle thus : "But though a
contract cannot impose the burdens of an obligation
upon one who is not a party to it,

nevertheless a

contract does impose a duty, upon person oxtraneous
to the obligation,
performance.*

not to interferc with its due

(Lawson on Cont

e3oc 115).

It

is said that to so hold would be to destroy

competition by protecting certain persons against it,
We grant thaL

and that such should not be.

has

one

no right to be p-otected against competition and that
if

disturbance or 1oss comes as a resualt o.

it

is

damnum absque injuria.

Assemb 26 At Rep 505 ;

(Lucke v.

Dudley v.

competition

Clothing etc.

Briggs,

141 Mass

However, if a valid contract exists, competition

b82).

in respect to the subject matter of such contract hag
coased,

and a

right has come

the

into existence,

In

interference with which the law will not permtit.
ether words, every one has an equal right to employ
workmen in his business,

yet, if a contract exists

whereby some other person is entitled to the further
continuance of the sernvice of suc.f workman,

one who

knowingly procures it to be violated ma,, be held liable
altho-gh he did it

own business.

for the

jiurpose

of promoting: his.

(!alker v. Croniin 10Y Mass p 563).

ilowever the iinjure(i party has riot an absolute
right,

knowledge of which the world must have at Its

peril,

and the interfeiricc

to at least nominal damages.
make out a case,

with which eititles
On the contrary,

him
to

he must show that the def1 ndant knowing-

ly caused a breach of the contract,

that the defend-

ant's act was the proximate cause of the breach,
that

the breach resulted in actual damages.

and

(Bligelow

on Torts p 141 ; Pollock on Torts, p 352 ; A':ish Dir & F
See 303, Seec 371).
The only one of these factors which calls for a
discussion is the one in regard to proximate causc,
it

for, unles

is shown that the defendant had knowl-

edge of the contract and that its
in actual damages,

breach resulted

wt. agree that no action lies.

It is said by some that the defendant's acts cannot be
the proximate cause of the breach in such ca:es,
the act of a free agent, namely, the one breaking the
contract, having intervened.

Are we to say that one

is to escape the consequences of his acts because he
accomplished it through the instrumentality of a third
party ?

Or

are we to consider those results proxi-

rqate which ht not only saw were likely to follow from
his acts,

but which he actually strove to produce ?

A statement of these questions must inevitably suggest
the correct answer,
authorities.

yet wc

shall look at some of the

Pollock defines proximatu cause as

follows : N Those consequences, and those only,

are deemed proxim&te,
petence and knowledge,

which a person of average combein,; in the like case with the

person whose conduct is complained of,
like opportunity of observation,

and having the

might be expected to

foresee as likely to follow upon such conduct.,
(Pollock on Torts #28).

Again Pollock says in sub-

stance that one cannot say that the result is not proximate to his act because some act of another party
has intervened,
happen.

if he saw that the result would

(Pollock on Torts #453-4).

We shall not

devote more time to this except to cite the following
authorities :

Scott v. Shepherd 2 Wt. Blackst Rep

892 ; *lwaukee &c R R Co v. Kellogg, 94 U S 469.
There is one more point upon which we must touch.
It is said that when two parties enter into a contract
they rely upon each other to fulfill the terms of the
same,

and expect upon the failure so to do to look to

the one breaking the contract for redress and to no
other.

The advocates of this theory fail to consider

the fact that the parties to a contract do not expect
interferunce from outside parties,
the contract is not carried out the

hence feel

that if

failure will be

due wholly to the act of a contracting party.

If they
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were to foresee that some wealthy individual, some strong
labor union, would interfere with the due performance
of their contract,

it is reasonable to prophesy that

they would not enter into contracts as freely as they
do,

unless they felt that the courts would not allow

this wrongful interference to go unheeded, this injury
to be without a remedy.

Because the parties did not

foresee the interference,
remedy,

hence, did not expect the

seems a poor reason for withholding the

remedy.
These are the several reasons advanced for holding that no action should lie,

and w. have attempted

to show the fallacies in the reasoning of those who advocate them.

If

w(; have succeeded in

action should lie,

this,

an

since they have failed to show

that this Is an excerption to the rule that no wrong
is without a remedy,
upon them.

and the burden of proof was

After a careful study of the question, we

are convinced that the weight of authority is in favor
of allowing

the action and

that principles of justice

and equity demand a redress for this injury, a remedy
for this wrong.

